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Police Interrogation and the Right to
Counsel, Post Escobedo v. Illinois:
Application v. Emasculation
By HENRY B. Rome_r*
The right to use counsel at the formal trial, [would be] a very hollow
thing [if], for all practical purposes, the conviction is already assured
by pretrial examination.'
IN 1960, the writer of this article explored the question of police in-
terrogation: the right to counsel and to prompt arraignment. This
was four years prior to Escobedo v. Illinois.3 In what follows, we ex-
plore the decisions subsequent to Escobedo. The area of exploration
will cover those avenues of pretrial examination which, as a result of
Escobedo, have become one-way streets in favor of the defendant.
Danny Escobedo was arrested without a warrant at 2:30 A.M. on
January 20, 1960, for the murder of his brother-in-law, which occurred
on the evening of January 19. He was questioned, made no statements,
and was released at 5 P.M. on a writ of habeas corpus.
On January 30, 1960, a codefendant told the police that Escobedo
had fired the fatal shots. Escobedo was arrested between 8 and 9 P.M.
that same evening. During the ride to the station, police officers told
the defendant that they had a strong case and that he should confess.
The defendant stated he wanted the advice of his lawyer.
Defendant's lawyer arrived at the police station between 9:30 and
10:00 P.M. and requested permission to see his client. The desk officer,
as well as several other policemen, told the lawyer he could not see
the accused. At 1:00 A.M., the lawyer was still unsuccessfully seeking
access to his client. During this entire period Escobedo was being
subjected to interrogation. In response to -his repeated requests for
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York Bars. Author of Successful Techniques in the Trial of Criminal Cases (Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1961) and Handbook of Evidence for Criminal Trials (Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965).
Chairman, Criminal Law Section, New York State Trial Lawyers Association. Editor-in-
Chief, Journal of the National Association of Defense Lawyers in Criminal Cases. Mem-
ber, Criminal Law Section, Amercian Bar Association.
IEscobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 487 (1964).
2 Rothblatt and Rothblatt, Police Interrogation: The Right to Counsel and to Prompt
Arraignment, 27 BRoox.,N L. REv. 23 (1960).
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permission to confer with his attorney, he was informed that the law-
yer did not wish to see him. Escobedo claimed that a police officer,
Officer Montejano, who knew him and his family, spoke to him alone
and told him he would try to get him released if he made a statement
implicating the codefendant, DiGerlando.
Later, when Escobedo was confronted with DiGerlando, he said
to him: "I didn't shoot Manuel, you did it."4 Self-inculpatory oral state-
ments followed and an experienced assistant State's Attorney was
called in to take a written statement. This attorney acknowledged
that he had not advised Escobedo of his right to counsel and to remain
silent, nor was it denied that no person during the interrogation
had so advised him.
The United States Supreme Court held that Escobedo had been
deprived of his constitutional right to counsel. It rested its conclusion
on five relevant factors:
[1] the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved
crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, [2] the suspect
has been taken into police custody, [3] the police carry out a process
of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating state-
ments, [4] the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity
to consult with his lawyer, [5] and the police have not effectively
warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent
.... 5 (Numbers in brackets supplied.)
The questioning of Escobedo was conducted prior to his formal
indictment. But the Court held that under the circumstances of the
case, this fact was irrelevant. It added that after his request to confer
with counsel and the denial of that request by the police, "the investi-
gation had ceased to be a general investigation of an 'unresolved
crime.' Escobedo had become the accused, and the purpose of the in-
terrogation was to 'get him' to confess his guilt despite his constitu-
tional right not to do so.""
The Court pointed out the "direct relationship between the in-
portance of a stage [the period of interrogation] to the police in their
quest for a confession and the criticalness of that stage to the accused
in his need for legal advice."7 It is at this critical stage that the "guid-
ing hand of counsel" s is most essential if the constitutional guarantee
4 Id. at 483.
51d. at 490-.91.
OId. at 485.
7 Id. at 488.
8 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932).
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of counsel is to be something more than a meaningless and bootless
right.
'By abandoning its former rule that only post-indictment interro-
gation would be challenged9 and holding that pre-indictment interro-
gation could also be attacked, where police activity shifts from the in-
vestigatory to the accusatory stage in "focusing' on an individual,
the Court has established a new locus for a fundamental constitutional
right.10
As Mr. Justice White in his dissenting opinion correctly points out,
it would be naive to think that the new constitutional right an-
nounced will depend upon whether the accused has retained his
own counsel" ... or has asked to consult with counsel in the course
of interrogation .... 12 At the very least the Court holds that once
the accused becomes a suspect and, presumably, is arrested, any ad-
mission made to the police thereafter is inadmissible in evidence
unless the accused has waived his right to counsel.18
What Mr. Justice White characterized as the Court's "invitation
to go farther"14 has been accepted by the Supreme Court of California
in the well-reasoned opinion of People v. Dorado."5 A prisoner in a
state penitentiary was found stabbed to death, the character of the
wounds indicating that they were inflicted by a small knife. In a trash
can in a nearby bathroom the prison officials found a bloodstained
jacket with the name "Dorado" printed on the pocket and a button
missing. In the same trash can was a sharp knife with a taped handle.
The missing button was found at the scene of the crime. The defend-
ant was found in his cell clad in his underwear. A subsequent search
of the cell turned up bloodstained trousers and tape similar to that
found on the knife. Dorado was then taken to a prison office where he
was told of the murder. He was subjected to a blood test to determine
if brown stains on his hand were the blood of the murdered prisoner.
Upon his return, a two-hour interrogation took place, following which
he confessed.
9 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
10 Cf. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
11 Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 10; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
12
"[R]equesting counsel" is a "formality" upon which the defendant's "right may
not be made to depend." Camley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962).
18 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 495 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
14 Id. at 496.
15 62 Cal. 2d 338, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1965), cert. denied, 381 U.S.
937 (1965).
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The California court considered the five relevant factors of Esco-
bedo and found: (1) The investigation had reached the critical ac-
cusatory stage and begun to "focus" on Dorado; (2) he was already
in police custody; (3) the interrogation was for the purpose of secur-
ing inculpatory statements from the accused; (5) Dorado had not
been warned of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.
However, the accused had failed to request counsel, so that the "re-
quest and denial" (4) factor of Escobedo was lacking. It thus appears
that Mr. Justice White had unwittingly facilitated the acceptance of
"the invitation." For in writing that it would make no difference if the
accused retained or even requested counsel,' 6 he opened the very
floodgates which he so vigorously fought to keep closed.
16Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 495 (1964). The California court in Dorado
uses Mr. Justice White's statement to justify its interpretation of Escobedo. 62 Cal. 2d
338, 350, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 177, 398 P.2d 361, 369 (1965). See also Miller v. Warden,
Maryland State Penitentiary, 338 F.2d 201, 204 (4th Cir. 1964); Wright v. Dickson,
336 F.2d 878, 882 (9th Cir. 1964); People v. Dorado, supra at 362, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 178,
398 P.2d at 370; State v. Neely, 395 P.2d 557, 560 (Ore. 1964).
The majority of the appellate courts throughout the country have rejected the
Dorado reasoning and have attempted to confine Escobedo to its facts. In Browne v.
State, 24 Wis. 2d 491, 131 N.W.2d 169 (1964) wherein no request was made, the
Wisconsin court wrote: "The most that Escobedo holds . . . is that the failure to inform
a criminal suspect under arrest [of his constitutional right to remain silent] when
coupled with other circumstances, may be sufficient to require exclusion of any ad-
mission by him. We find here a total lack of any other circumstances which require
exclusion of the instant admissions." Id. at 511g, 131 N.W.2d at 171. Accord, Cephus v.
United States, 33 U.S.L. W=E 2674 (D.C. Cir. June 21, 1965); United States, ex rel.
Townsend v. Ogilvie, 339 F.2d 837, 843 (7th Cir. 1964); State v. Fox, 131 N.W.2d
684 (Iowa, 1965); Bean v. State, 398 P.2d 251 (Nev. 1965); State v. Scanlon, 84 N.J.
Super. 427, 202 A.2d 448 (1964); People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852,
257 N.Y.S.2d 924 (1965).
In Dorado the court found that a specific request on the part of the defendant was
an artificial requirement; the test must be a substantive one whether or not the point of
necessary protection had been reached. People v. Dorado, supra at 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. at
176, 398 P.2d at 368. Accord, United States ex rel. Rivers v. Myers, 240 F. Supp. 39
(E.D. Pa. 1965); United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2621, (3d
Cir. May 20th, 1965), cert. denied, 33 U.S.L. WEs_ 3389 (1965); State v. Mendes, 210
A.2d 50 (R.I. 1965).
On July 12th more fuel was thrown into the fire of controversy when the New
Jersey Supreme Court flatly refused to follow the Third Circuit's holding in Russo. State
v. Ordoz [Rush], N.Y. Times, July 29th, 1965, p.1, col. 1 (city ed.). The New Jersey
court upheld its own Chief Justice Weintraub who, some two weeks after Russo was
decided, sent a letter to all New Jersey judges directing them to ignore the Third
Circuit's ruling.
Once the investigation has begun to focus on the accused, he must be informed of
his right to remain silent. State v. Neely, 395 P,2d 557 (Ore. 1965); see also Altson v.
United States, 348 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1965); see generally Note, 19 RuTcEns L. REV.
111 (1964). For a discussion on how the trial lawyer presents the "failure to inform"
to the jury and sample requests to charge, see RorHBLATr, SuccEssFuL TECHQUES nrq
THE TnwA OF Cim INAL CAsEs 140-41, 211-15 (1961).
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In Dorado, the California court rejected the narrow and formal-
istic reading of Escobedo, reasoning that if a demand for counsel was
a requirement, this would discriminate against an accused who did
not know about his right to counsel. The court wrote:
The defendant who does not ask for counsel is the very defendant
who most needs counsel. We cannot penalize a defendant who, not
understanding his constitutional rights, does not make the formal
request and by such failure demonstrates his helplessness. To require
the request would be to favor the defendant whose sophistication or
status has fortuitously prompted him to make it."
The dissenting opinion of Justice McComb makes the point that
the suspect in Dorado neither requested nor was denied an oppor-
tunity to confer with counsel. "Under the precise and limiting lan-
guage... in the Escobedo case," he said, "it is clear that the facts in
the instant case are different, and that the Escobedo case is not
applicable.""'
Justice Burke, who also dissented, agreed with the majority that
as a practical matter the right to counsel should not depend upon a
request. However, Justice Burke pointed out that the accused had
been convicted of a previous offense and it was presumed that he had
been informed at prior arraignments and trials of his right to have
counsel. He then contrasted the degrees of criminal sophistication of
Danny Escobedo and Robert Dorado, concluding that the circum-
stances of the two cases render the Escobedo decision inapplicable to
the Dorado case. He stated that "the crucial test at the accusatory
stage is whether we may reasonably infer from the circumstances ...
of the particular case that the accused was aware of his constitutional
rights."' 9
If, as Justice Burke suggests, we are to presume that because of
previous convictions, Robert Dorado knew of his right to have counsel
at the prearraignment stage, some three years before the Supreme
Court of the United States decided Escobedo,20 it "would be to ascribe
to him an utterly fictitious clairvoyance." 21
Justice .Burke interprets the Escobedo test as the "sum total of
the circumstances resulting in a fundamental prejudice to the ac-
17 People v. Dorado, supra note 16, at 351, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 177-78, 398 P.2d at
369-70.
18 Id. at 362, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 185, 398 P.2d at 377.
'1 Id. at 366, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 187, 398 P.2d at 379; See State v. Vigliano, 43 N.J.
44, 202 A.2d 657 (1964).
20 The homicide in Dorado took place in 1961.
21 People v. Stewart, 62 Cal. 2d 571, 581, 43 Cal. Rptr. 201, 207, 400 P.2d 97, 103
(1965).
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cused.22 This interpretation is based on Crooker v. California,3 where
a thirty-one year old college graduate, who had completed the first
year of law school and had studied criminal law, confessed to murder.
During his interrogation, the defendant had requested and was denied
an opportunity to consult with counsel. He refused to submit to a lie
detector test and answered a number of questions in a very "profes-
sional" manner. He indicated an awareness of his right to remain
silent, and no coercive tactics were used. In an opinion by Mr. Justice
Clark, the Court found that the sum total of the circumstances of this
case did not vouchsafe to Crooker the right to counsel at interrogation.
The Court added that the due process right to counsel is violated if
the defendant "is so prejudiced thereby as to infect his subsequent
trial with an absence of the fundamental fairness essential to the very
concept of justice."2 4 Mr. Justice Douglas writing for a four-man mi-
nority rejected the "sum total of the circumstance" test and quoted
from Gaser v. United States25 to support his position: "The right to
have counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to in-
dulge in mere calculations as to the amount of prejudice resulting in
its denial."28
In Escobedo, Mr. Justice Goldberg added his vote to the four dis-
senters of Crooker to make the minority a majority. After discussing
and distinguishing the facts of Crooker, he wrote: "In any event, to
the extent that . . . Crooker may be inconsistent with the principle
announced today, [it is] not to be regarded as controlling." 7 This
statement, together with the dissenting opinion in Crooker, so dilutes
Crooker and the "sum total" test that the Crooker decision must be
strictly confined to the facts of the case.2
22 People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 367, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 188, 398 P.2d 361, 380
(1965).
23357 U.S. 433 (1958).
24 Id. at 439. The "fundamental fairness" test was rejected in Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963). Of this rejection the Second Circuit wrote, "it
was precisely this sort of elusive and unsatisfactory inquiry into the possibility of prej-
udice which Gideon sought to inter once and for all.... [A] criminal defendant com-
pelled to act without the advice of counsel will always be disadvantaged thereby, and
.. . the precise degree of that disadvantage can never be satisfactorily measured by
an after-the-fact search for prejudice." United States ex rel. DuRocher v. LaVellee,
330 F.2d 303, 308 (2d Cir. 1964).
25 315 U.S. 60 '(1942).
26 Id. at 76.
27 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964).
28 Several courts consider the "totality of the circumstances" test still applicable
and have atttempted to distinguish their decisions from Escobedo. In Mefford v. State,
235 Md. 497, 201 A.2d 824 (1964), the accused never asked for a lawyer, there was
no prolonged detention, he voluntarily offered the statement, and his request to see
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL. [Vol. 17
POLICE INTERROGATION
In Escobedo, Mr. Justice Goldberg wrote that the right to counsel
matures, "when the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory--
when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confes-
sion.... 2 9 Once again we return to a California decision to examine
the application of this holding. In People v. Stewart,80 the police were
investigating a series of "purse snatch" assaults, one of which resulted
in the death of the victim. A check taken in one of the robberies was
cashed and Stewart identified as the endorser. A police officer went
to the defendant's residence and placed him under arrest. The officer
requested permission to search the house and was given the "go
ahead." After the search an interrogation took place. Stewart, without
being informed of his rights, made several self-incriminating state-
ments. At a subsequent interrogation he confessed to the felony-
murder robbery.
The Supreme Court of California reversed the conviction and, in
the course of its opinion, discussed the accusatory stage of interroga-
tion at length. The arrest encompassed the "focus"31 and "police cus-
tody 2 factors of Escobedo. However, the court reasoned that the
his wife was granted. Mefford was also informed of his privilege to remain silent,
and thus, reasoned the court, the police had given the defendant the same advice he
would have received from his lawyer.
In Van Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948), Mr. Justice Black discussed at
length the advice of government officials. "The constitution does not contemplate that
prisoners shall be dependent upon government agents for legal counsel and aid, how-
ever conscientious and able those agents may be. Undivided allegiance and faithful,
devoted service to a client are prized traditions of the American lawyer. It is this
kind of service for which the Sixth Amendment makes provision." Id. at 725-26.
In Pece v. Cox, 74 N.M. 591, 396 P.2d 422 (1964), although the defendant was not
informed of his right to counsel, the confession which he was requested to sign con-
tained a statement that he need not sign and could remain mute. See also People v.
Hartgraves, 31 IMI. 2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964), cert. denied, 85 Sup. Ct. 1104
(1965); Commonwealth v. Coyle, 415 Pa. 379, 203 A.2d 783 (1964); Browne v. State,
24 Wis. 2d 491, 131 N.W.2d 169 (1965) cert. denied, 85 Sup. Ct. 1094 (1965).
It has been expressed that Crooker has been "buried" by Escobedo and the recent
Court decisions. Lee v. United States, 322 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1963); See generally
Norenberg, Police Detention and Interrogation of Uncounselled Suspects: The Supreme
Court and the States, 54 B.U.L. REv. 430 (1964); Sutherland, A Forum on the In-
terrogation of the Accused, 49 CoRsNLL L.Q. 377, 416-17 (1964); Shadoan, New
Developments in Confession Suppression, 31 J.D.C.B.A. 502 (1964); Note, The Su-
preme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HAEv. L. Ray. 143, 220 (1964); Note, 53 CALwF. L. REV.
337 (1965).
29 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964).
8062 Cal. 2d 571, 43 Cal. Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97 (1965).
8 1 An arrest in California either with or without a warrant must be founded on
probable cause. CAL. PREN. CODE §§ 813, 836.
32 By definition, an arrest includes the taking of a person into custody. CAL. PEN.
CODE § 834.
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"critical"33 stage is not reached unless another condition precedent is
met: the police must "carry out a process of interrogations that lends
itself to eliciting incriminating statements ....,34
In United States v. Konigsberg,35 several persons were arrested in
a garage containing stolen men's suits and were removed to a local Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation office. At the office prior to arraignment,
Konigsberg was asked "why he was in the garage and what had taken
place.., and... if he wished to cleanse himself or explain ... what
his reasons for being there were."3 6
The Third Circuit found that the process was investigative and
had not shifted to the accusatory stage. Its purpose was not to elicit
a confession, but rather to give Konigsberg an opportunity to explain
his presence in the garage. "Focus was not centered on Konigsberg,
there was a general inquiry . . . concerning the unsolved hijacking
.... ." The F.B.I. agent testified that the questions were put to Ko-
nigsberg in a conversational manner and the Third Circuit distin-
guished the "conversational" tone in Konigsberg from the "aggressive
interrogation" of Escobedo.
This is a false and unduly restrictive distinction. The manner in
which the questions are asked is irrelevant. The true test is whether
the purpose of the questioning is to encourage the accused to make
an incriminating statement "despite his constitutional right not to do
so."38 The arrest is usually followed by some form of interrogation and
one would be naive to believe that the use of the word "cleanse"
changes this purpose.
In order to determine if the police are carrying out a "process of
interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminatory statements,"3 9
the California Supreme Court proposes to "analyze the total situation
which envelopes the questioning by considering such factors as the
length of the interrogation, the place and time of the interrogation,
the nature of the questions, the conduct of the police and all other
33 Chief Judge Anderson of the United States District Court of Connecticut defines
the critical stage thus: at the time "an accused is arrested on a particular charge." Panel:
Representation of Defendants, 36 F.R.D. 129, 141 (1964). See also Enker and Elsen,
Counsel for the Suspect: Messiah v. United States, Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MnM. L.
REV. 47, 71-73 (1964); Rothblatt and Rothblatt, supra note 2, at 32.
34 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 (1964).
35336 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1964).
86 Id. at 852. (Emphasis added.)
37 Id. at 853.
38 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485 (1964).
89 Id. at 491.
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relevant circumstances." 40 The actual intent or subjective purpose of
the police is unimportant, and the test, if one is necessary, must be
based on an objective consideration of the circumstances.4'
In most cases the "critical stage" will be reached immediately upon
the arrest of the accused. The fourth amendment, which is made oblig-
atory upon the states through the fourteenth42 mandates that an ar-
rest be based on probable cause.43 The investigation may continue,
but nevertheless, an individual has been placed in the "spotlight." The
arrested individual becomes a prime suspect and our "adversary sys-
tem begins to operate."44 Nothing prohibits the police from getting
"information from witnesses,"45 but by their own choice they have
brought about the crystallization of the "critical stage." It is at this
point that the prime suspect must be informed of his constitutional
right to counsel and to remain silent.
Are there any circumstances which might excuse the police from
informing a "prime suspect" of his constitutional rights? In a recent
case,40 the police were searching for a missing infant after finding her
sister beaten to death. The prime suspect was approached'by an officer
and investigator from the District Attorney's office. They suggested
to the-suspect that the girl might still be alive and her life could be
saved. The defendant then blurted out words which led to the dis-
covery of the body. The court engaged in a balancing act and came
up with this conclusion:
The paramount interest in saving her life, if possible, clearly justified
the officers in not impeding their rescue efforts by informing de-
fendant of his rights .... [The] investigatory and rescue operations
were... inextricably interwoven... and it would be needlessly re-
strictive to exclude any evidence lawfully obtained during the rescue
operations.47
Although this case turns on a unique and compelling set of facts,
the better conclusion would have resulted in suppression of the state-
40 People v. Stewart, 62 Cal. 2d 571, 579, 43 Cal. Rptr. 201, 206, 400 P.2d 97,
103 (1965).
41 People v. Stewart, supra note 40; Enker and Elsen, supra note 33, at 71.
42 WolE v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
43Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1961); Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307 (1959).
44 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964).
45 Ibid.
46 People v. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d 436, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417, 398 P.2d 753 (1965).
47 Id. at 446, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 423, 398 P.2d at 759.
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ments. The good faith of police officers does not justify the denial of
a constitutional right.48
From the preceding discussion, it appears that one need not be
arrested to come within the protective scope of Escobedo. In Biddle
v. Commonwealth,49 the police were called in to investigate the death
of a baby. The infant's body was sent to the medical examiner for an
autopsy. At 9:30 in the evening, two detectives, armed with the
medical examiner's report, requested that the mother and father ac-
company them to police headquarters. At headquarters the parents
were informed that the child's death resulted from malnutrition and
dehydration. The mother was questioned, about the feeding schedule
of the baby and replied that it was normal. The husband was then
removed from the room and the wife left alone. When the detective
returned she was in tears. He asked her if "she wanted to tell him the
truth about how she fed the baby." 0 Mrs. Biddle then proceeded to
make self-inculpatory statements.
The Virginia court refused to exclude the statements, holding that
the police were merely investigating whether a crime had been com-
mitted and that the investigatory stage of the process had not yet
concluded. The death of the baby was caused by malnutrition and
dehydration, causes which logically result from parental neglect. The
question posed to the mother clearly indicated that the spotlight had
focused on her and that the interrogation had as its sole purpose the
extraction of self-incriminatory statements.
One further example of the misapplication of the "critical stage"
concept is necessary to drive the point home. An accused was being
interrogated by the Massachusetts police in connection with a rob-
bery. During the course of the interrogation he made some self-in-
criminating statements concerning a murder in Philadelphia.,1 The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania admitted these statements, holding
that "the... killing was... not the main focal point of the interroga-
tion but merely a corollary thereof. It was, therefore, not such a
'critical stage' in the proceedings . . . that the absence of counsel
would vitiate any damaging admissions as to the present issue."52
The so-called "precise and limiting"53 language of Escobedo in-
48 Director General v. Kastenbaum, 263 U.S. 25, 28 (1923).
49 141 S.E.2d 710 (Va. 1965).
50 Id. at 711.
51 Commonwealth v. Coyle, 415 Pa. 379, 203 A.2d 783 (1964).
52Id. at 403, 203 A.2d at 794-95.
53 People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 362, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 185, 398 P.2d 361, 377
(1965) (McComb, J., dissenting).
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eludes the following: "no statement elicited by the police may be used
against him at a criminal trial." 4 (Emphasis added.) The Pennsyl-
vania court apparently overlooked this language.
The Supreme Court of Oregon, in reversing a rape conviction,
found that since there was no evidence that the accused had been in-
formed of his right to remain silent, the prosecution had failed to
prove an essential element of its case.55
The current controversy centers over the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia's proper interpretation of Escobedo. New York, which for many
years had blazed a trail in this most important constitutional area58
has abdicated its courageous leadership.57 In a single paragraph, New
York's highest court would seem to have declined to extend its own
rule that the refusal to permit an accused to see his lawyer during
his interrogation vitiates his confession,58 rejected Dorado, and ignored
Escobedo. Certainly, the Court of Appeals would not want to limit
the constitutional right to counsel to defendants who, or whose fami-
lies, have the funds, foresight, and opportunity to retain counsel prior
to or immediately upon arrest. This concept runs counter to society's
effort to accord the indigent the same rights and privileges as the
affluent.59
The narrow and overly restrictive interpretations of Escobedo can
only serve to hamper and delude those in charge of the administration
of criminal justice. The discernible trend of Supreme Court decisions
54 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491 (1964).
55 State v. Neely, 395 P.2d 557, 561 (Ore. 1964). The same rule applies to the
right of counsel. See also People v. Lilliock, 62 Cal. 2d 618, 43 Cal. Rptr. 699, 401 P.2d
4 (1965), where the court reasoned that since the admission of an extra-judicial con-
fession required a showing that the accused had been advised of his constitutional
right to counsel and to remain silent or had intelligently waived these rights, "it
must follow that the burden of showing that such advice had been given by the au-
thorities or that the defendant otherwise waived these rights should fall on the prose-
cution." Id. at 621-22, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 702, 401 P.2d at 6.
56People v. Failla, 14 N.Y.2d 178, 199 N.E.2d 366, 250 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1964);
People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963); People
v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1961); People v. Di-
Biasi, 7 N.Y.2d 544, 166 N.E.2d 825, 200 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1960). The United States
Supreme Court recognized the leadership of the New York Court of Appeals in this
field when it cited with approval a series of cases in Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201, 205 (1964). In addition, the rationale of these cases was adopted in Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486 (1964). See Rothblatt and Rothblatt, supra note 2, at 60.
57 See People v. Gunner, 15 N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d 924
(1965). (However, the court affirmed a reversal of the conviction on other grounds.)
5S People v. Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963).
59 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Griffin v. Illiois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956). RonmLA'r, HANDBoox OF EvmzFcE FoR CmmNL T m.s 139 (1965).
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must ultimately lead to a caveat requiring that all suspects be ap-
prised of their right to counsel and to remain silent. The police must
obtain their evidence and establish their case against the offender in-
dependently of any confession. The best policy is for all law enforce-
ment agencies to inform the suspect of his constitutional rights.
Crime, as well as its prevention and investigation, is a major prob-
lem facing our society. It is axiomatic that the solution does not lie in
a narrow and ultra-formalistic reading of cases interpreting the Con-
stitution. Rather, the answer lies in the development of novel,
dynamic, skillful and more imaginative methods of criminal investi-
gation.
